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INTRODUCTION
When Congress enacted the Toxic Substances ControlAct (“TSCA”) in 1976, the Act was considered a“major step forward in providing urgently needed
authority to protect human health and the environment from
dangerous chemicals.”3 Practitioners, however, have long rec-
ognized that TSCA has failed to live up to its promise. 
As TSCA reaches its 30-year anniversary, a variety of sci-
entific, economic, and political factors have triggered a renewed
dialogue about reforming the U.S. chemicals management
framework. This article explains why a modernization of TSCA
is not only necessary from a public health perspective, but for
business reasons as well.
The public health case for TSCA reform is prompted by
undeniable new scientific evidence showing widespread human
exposure to industrial chemicals. For example, hundreds of
untested industrial chemicals have been detected in the umbili-
cal cord blood of the typical newborn baby in the United States.
While medical researchers debate whether this low level chem-
ical exposure is associated with the growing occurrence of can-
cer, neurodevelopmental disorders, or other diseases, there is no
doubt that U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA” or
“Agency”) has little information about the potential health and
safety implications of these chemicals. The last three decades
have demonstrated that the Agency lacks the tools needed to
effectively evaluate or respond to the potential human health
risks unveiled by scientific testing. 
The business rationale for modernizing the nation’s toxic
chemicals law is equally compelling. New laws in the
European Union and in several U.S. states are creating a patch-
work of inconsistent chemical regulations that will place many
U.S. businesses at a disadvantage. At the same time, business-
es are discovering that there is money to be made in producing
less toxic products. In addition, the rapid emergence of nan-
otechnology necessitates a more effective regulatory frame-
work that can encourage innovation and foster acceptance by
the public and investors.
The convergence of these factors creates significant pres-
sure to modernize TSCA. Taken together, modernization of the
U.S. chemicals management framework is inevitable in the
next several years.
THE PUBLIC HEALTH CASE FOR TSCA REFORM
TSCA’s antiquated framework is inadequate to meet the
challenges uncovered by modern science. Additionally, biomon-
itoring studies show widespread human exposure to industrial
chemicals, many of which have never been evaluated for poten-
tial adverse human health effects.
Recent scientific advances in analytic testing have trans-
formed our understanding of human exposure to manmade
chemicals. Through biomonitoring studies, scientists have now
detected well over a hundred industrial chemicals in the bodies
of most Americans. As discussed below, low concentrations of
flame-retardants, plastic softeners, and long banned chemicals
such as polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) are virtually ubiq-
uitous in the blood and fat tissue of most Americans today. As a
result, biomonitoring (also known as body burden) studies have
created significant pressure to modernize the U.S. chemicals
management framework.
The new data gleaned from biomonitoring is defined as “a
scientific technique for assessing human exposures to natural
and synthetic compounds in the environment.”4 Typically, sci-
entists analyze human blood, urine samples, or fat tissue to
determine whether a person has been exposed to a particular
chemical. Advances in recent years have improved scientists’
ability to detect even small concentrations of chemicals in our
bodies. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(“CDC”) explains that “biomonitoring measurements are the
most health-relevant assessments of exposure because they
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“If we are going to live so intimately with these
chemicals – eating and drinking them, taking
them into the very marrow of our bones – we
had better know something about their nature
and their power.”
– Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (1962)1
“EPA has used its authority to require testing
for fewer than 200 of the 62,000 chemicals in
commerce when EPA began reviewing
chemicals under TSCA in 1979... Only five
chemical substances or groups of chemical
substances have been regulated...”
– U.S. Government Accountability Office evaluation of
the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (2005)2
measure the amount of the chemical that actually gets into peo-
ple from all environmental sources (e.g., air, soil, water, dust, or
food) combined.”5 Perflurooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) is one of
countless examples illustrating the gaps created by TSCA’s out-
dated framework. 
While numerous biomonitoring studies have been conduct-
ed in the United States, the CDC has conducted the most ambi-
tious effort. In July 2005, the CDC issued the third of its bien-
nial “National Report on Human Exposure to Environmental
Chemicals,” evaluating the U.S. population’s exposure to 148
environmental chemicals. Strikingly, they detected all but two
of the 148 chemicals in at least some of the samples tested.6 In
other words, CDC found human exposure to virtually every
chemical for which it looked. 
For example, CDC found “widespread” exposure to phtha-
lates, an industrial chemical used to soften and increase the flex-
ibility of plastics and vinyl.7 According to the CDC, phthalates
have been demonstrated to cause adverse reproductive toxicity
and other effects in animal studies, though little information is
available about the potential human health impacts.
Significantly, the CDC also detected continued human exposure
to chemicals banned decades ago in the United States, such as
PCBs, which were banned from intentional production in 1979.8
Another remarkable study focused on industrial chemicals in
human umbilical cord blood. Using donated cord blood samples
from the United States Red Cross, the Environmental Working
Group (“EWG”) found an average of 200 manmade chemicals
and pollutants in babies born in the United States in 2004.9
Alarmingly, a total of 287 chemicals were found to have crossed
the placental barrier into the baby. Among the chemicals detected
were polybrominated diphenyl ethers used as flame retardants in
furniture, polychlorinated naphthalene used as wood preserva-
tives, and perfluorochemicals used as stain and oil repellants.
Biomonitoring is already having a real world impact on the
marketplace. The most recent example involves the perfluoro-
chemical PFOA, widely used in the production of non-stick pans
and stain resistant clothes and carpet. Numerous biomonitoring
studies found that PFOA has become commonplace in the bod-
ies of most Americans. Researchers at Johns Hopkins Hospital
recently confirmed the presence of this industrial chemical in 99
percent of the umbilical cord blood of 300 newborns born at the
Hospital.10 PFOA is known to bio-accumulate in the human body
and an EPA Science Advisory Board draft report recently classi-
fied PFOA as a “likely carcinogen.”11 As a result of these devel-
opments, EPA obtained agreements from DuPont and the other
major manufacturers of PFOA to essentially phase-out produc-
tion voluntarily over the next fifteen years.12
This new information on the prevalence of human exposure
to industrial chemicals is dramatically different from the scien-
tific understanding of the 1970s. When TSCA was enacted in
1976, chemicals contained within consumer products were gen-
erally not believed to be a significant source of potential expo-
sure (except perhaps for chemical or farm workers).
Biomonitoring now has proven otherwise. While we still do not
understand all of the exposure pathways, it is undeniable that
human exposure to industrial chemicals is far more prevalent
than previously understood.13
The real question of course is – how safe are we? Some
medical researchers estimate that environmental toxins cause up
to 35 percent of asthma cases, ten percent of cancer cases, and
twenty percent of neurobehavioral disorders in children and
contribute to respiratory disorders, cancer, infertility, and heart
disease in adults.14 On the other hand, the chemical industry
argues that the extremely low concentrations of chemicals often
detected through biomonitoring likely are too minute to cause
adverse health impacts. 
What is undisputed is that insufficient information is available
about the potential human health impacts of many of the chemicals
commonly found in our bodies. As such, public concern about bio-
monitoring results and the rapidly growing body of scientific liter-
ature linking industrial chemicals to potentially adverse health
impacts is prompting a fundamental reevaluation of TSCA.
TSCA FAILS TO PROVIDE EPA WITH THE TOOLS
NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY EVALUATE CHEMICALS
The discovery of widespread human exposure to industrial
chemicals raises the question – is TSCA up to the challenge?
Unfortunately, the answer is no. This article evaluates EPA’s
record with respect to chemicals on the initial 1979 Inventory
(so-called “existing chemicals”), the Agency’s new chemicals
program, its authority to take action to reduce chemical risks,
and its voluntary initiatives. In each respect, TSCA fails to give
EPA the tools needed to effectively evaluate and manage the
risks posed by industrial chemicals.
FEW CHEMICALS IN COMMERCE SINCE 1979 HAVE
UNDERGONE EPA REVIEW
By any measure, EPA’s record with respect to reviewing the
safety of existing chemicals is unacceptable. A recent report by
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) conclud-
ed that “EPA does not routinely assess existing chemicals, has
limited information on their health and environmental risks, and
has issued few regulations controlling such substances.”15
The data speaks for itself: of the 62,000 chemicals in com-
merce in 1979 when the EPA program began, EPA has used its
authority to require testing for fewer than 200.16 Further, EPA has
performed internal reviews of only an estimated two percent of
the chemicals on EPA’s original TSCA inventory.17 No wonder
that little information exists on so many of the chemicals now
being detected in human bodies through biomonitoring studies.
EPA cannot fairly be blamed for this intolerable record.
Rather, the program was doomed from the start. Congress
declared that it should be the “responsibility of those who man-
ufacture and those who process” chemical substances to develop
“adequate data” about their effects on health and the environ-
ment.18 While the purpose is clear, the statute fails to require
chemical companies to submit basic toxicity information to EPA.
Instead, EPA was forced to gather this information itself.
The Agency’s primary statutory tool for data collection, howev-
er, has proven ineffectual. Under TSCA section 4(a)(1), EPA can
require chemical manufacturers to conduct testing if the EPA
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Administrator finds that the chemical or mixture “may present
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”19
This creates a classic “Catch-22” situation. The Agency
must already have sufficient data to demonstrate that a chemical
poses an unreasonable risk of injury to human health or the
environment before it can start a data collection rulemaking.
Based on the circular logic of this provision, EPA must already
have the data needed to evaluate a chemical’s risk in order to
compel companies to submit the missing data.20
Another crippling gap in EPA’s ability to evaluate the
human health risks posed by existing chemicals is TSCA’s fail-
ure to require companies to develop and submit essential infor-
mation on chemical uses and potential human exposure. Risk is
often described as a function of hazard plus exposure. The
absence of a requirement in TSCA that manufacturers disclose
basic information on chemical uses and potential exposure path-
ways makes it impossible for the Agency to develop an effec-
tive, risk-based program. 
To partially address this concern, EPA issued a TSCA
Inventory Update rule in 2003, requiring among other things,
that chemical companies provide readily obtainable exposure-
related use and processing information at sites with production
volumes at 300,000 pounds or above. While a good first step,
the limited information required
under this rule is woefully
insufficient to allow EPA to
properly assess actual, real-
world human exposure. Without
more comprehensive exposure
information, EPA is left without
a meaningful way to calculate
risk.
As a result, EPA officials
acknowledge that TSCA’s
authorities are not an effective
means of testing large numbers
of chemicals. In 30 years, EPA
has issued rules requiring testing for only 185 of the approxi-
mately 82,000 chemicals currently on the TSCA Inventory.21 As
GAO concluded, “EPA has made little progress in reviewing
existing chemicals since EPA began reviewing chemicals under
TSCA in 1979.”22
EPA LACKS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO
ADEQUATELY EVALUATE NEW CHEMICALS
Without question, TSCA’s new chemicals review program
is much superior to that for existing chemicals. Nevertheless,
EPA remains hamstrung by TSCA’s limitations that prevent the
Agency from obtaining the toxicity and exposure information
necessary to protect public health. As a result, GAO found that
“EPA lacks sufficient data to ensure that potential health and
environmental risks of new chemicals are identified.”23
Under TSCA section 5, chemical companies are required to
submit a pre-manufacture notice to EPA of their intention to pro-
duce a new chemical. But companies are not required to submit
test data regarding the chemical’s toxicity and, not surprisingly,
most companies do not voluntarily provide such data. GAO
found that only about fifteen percent of pre-manufacture notices
included health or safety test data.24
Faced with the lack of actual data, EPA scientists have lit-
tle choice but to evaluate a chemical’s toxicity through
reliance on modeling techniques, such as structure activity
relationship analysis. Using this approach, a new chemical is
compared to chemicals with similar molecular structures with
known health and safety effects. However, these models have
never been validated for regulatory purposes. In fact, GAO
highlighted a joint EPA and European Union study in 1993
showing that the accuracy of EPA’s predictions varied depend-
ing upon the effect or property being compared.25 A 2001
study conducted by PPG Industries found a 25 percent error
rate when comparing the model’s results to actual test data for
certain environmental end points.26
The uncertainty surrounding the toxicity and health effects
of new chemicals is compounded by the inadequate data avail-
able on potential exposure. Under TSCA section 5, companies
are required to include basic exposure data as part of the pre-
manufacture notice, including information on categories of uses,
anticipated production volume, and potential exposure levels
and releases. While valuable, this data quickly becomes obso-
lete as production and market
conditions change. TSCA,
unfortunately, does not require
companies to update their pre-
manufacture notices. As a result,
EPA must rely on exposure data
that often is outdated soon after
production commences. 
Notwithstanding these limi-
tations, EPA’s new chemical
review program plays an impor-
tant role in screening out industri-
al chemicals that may pose a
threat to human health. Over the
30-year program, EPA’s reviews have resulted in some form of
Agency action to address potential risks to human health for over
ten percent of new chemicals submitted for review.27 Nevertheless,
more complete and up-to-date toxicity and exposure data about
new chemicals is needed to enhance EPA’s ability to respond to the
challenges uncovered by modern medical science.
TSCA’S STANDARD FOR RESTRICTING CHEMICALS HAS
PROVEN UNWORKABLE
While most chemicals do not pose potential human health
risks, public health agencies must be empowered to take action
when appropriate. TSCA practitioners have learned, however,
that the statute’s standard is simply impracticable. EPA officials
acknowledge that “even when EPA has toxicity and exposure
information on existing chemicals, ... [the Agency] has difficul-
ty demonstrating that harmful chemicals pose an unreasonable
risk and that they should be banned or have limits put on their
production or use.”28
Again, the data speaks for itself. Over the course of 30
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[U]ncertainty surrounding
the toxicity and health
effects of new chemicals is
compounded by …
inadequate data.
years, EPA has issued regulations to ban or limit the production
or restrict the use of only five chemicals. The Agency has not
even initiated such a rulemaking since 1989.
The landmark case illustrating the practical difficulties of
implementing TSCA’s safety standard concerned asbestos. After
scrutinizing the issue for a decade and evaluating over one hun-
dred studies, EPA determined that asbestos was a potential car-
cinogen at all levels of exposure and posed an unreasonable risk
to health and the environment.29 A federal court invalidated
EPA’s asbestos ban in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d
1201 (5th Cir. 1991). The court found that EPA “basically
ignored the cost side of the TSCA equation”30 and failed to ade-
quately consider less burdensome alternatives.31
The burden of proof imposed on EPA under TSCA section
6 is overwhelming and unrealistic. To limit use or ban produc-
tion of a chemical, the Agency must meet two tests. First, EPA
must have substantial evidence to prove that the chemical pres-
ents “an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment.” This requires EPA to make an array of technically ardu-
ous findings, including an evaluation of (1) the effects of the
chemical on human health or the environment; (2) the extent of
potential exposure; (3) the chemical’s benefits; (4) the availabil-
ity of substitutes for each known use; and (5) the reasonably
ascertainable economic consequences of the rule.
If EPA is able to clear these hurdles, the Agency must then
determine that its proposed course of action is “the least bur-
densome alternative.” In other words, EPA must establish that
restrictions such as warning labels or use limitations would not
be sufficient to address the risks before imposing a more
restrictive limitation.
The asbestos decision has cast a long shadow, with many
TSCA practitioners believing that EPA could never meet the
statutory standard as interpreted by the court. EPA apparently
agrees since the Agency has not started a single rulemaking to
limit production or ban the use of a chemical since this court
decision over fifteen years ago.
EPA’S VOLUNTARY HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME
CHALLENGE IS INADEQUATE TO PROTECT HUMAN
HEALTH
Tacitly recognizing TSCA’s ineffectiveness, many chemical
manufacturers have worked with the Agency to develop the
High Production Volume (“HPV”) chemical challenge, essen-
tially to fill the data gaps left by TSCA’s unworkable regulatory
framework. Despite considerable progress, this voluntary initia-
tive was not intended and cannot substitute for an effective risk
based chemical management system.
The HPV Challenge program was prompted by a 1997
report by Environment Defense entitled “Toxic Ignorance,”
finding that EPA lacked basic toxicity information about the
great majority of the most heavily used industrial chemicals.32
EPA subsequently confirmed that 93 percent of chemicals pro-
duced in volumes exceeding one million pounds annually
lacked complete toxicity screening data.33 Forty-three percent of
these HPV chemicals had no health or safety data available.
Many chemical manufacturers stepped up to the challenge
in 1998 and pledged to develop basic screening level informa-
tion for roughly 2,200 of the 2,800 HPV chemicals.34 Health
and safety data is beginning to pour in for EPA and public
review. In addition, the industry announced plans in 2005 to
expand the program to include additional chemicals that have
reached HPV status since the program was initially launched.
While the success of this voluntary program is consider-
able, the program’s limitations should not be ignored. First, hun-
dreds of HPV chemicals lack industry sponsors, which means
no one has voluntarily agreed to provide the screening level test
data that EPA needs.35 It is unclear whether EPA has the politi-
cal will or statutory authority to require the generation of this
data for these so-called “orphan chemicals.”
Second, EPA pledged last year to evaluate this initial
screening data and identify approximately five to ten percent of
the HPV chemicals that merit additional scrutiny.36 President
Bush’s budget for next fiscal year, however, proposes a $2.2
million dollar cut for EPA’s HPV program.37 Without adequate
resources, the data on these chemicals – produced annually at
over a million pounds – will sit at EPA collecting dust. 
Finally, even if EPA can overcome the obstacles involv-
ing orphan chemicals and the annual congressional funding
battle for this voluntary initiative, the ultimate question
remains – can the Agency act to address the risks posed by a
dangerous chemical? As discussed earlier, the legal hurdles
imposed by TSCA – as interpreted by the courts – seriously
cripple the Agency’s ability to take action. A voluntary pro-
gram does not change EPA’s statutory limitations. While the
HPV challenge is a laudable effort, it is insufficient to fill the
gaps created by TSCA. 
In sum, recent scientific advances in biomonitoring have
revealed that all of us – even newborns – have industrial chem-
icals in our bodies. Adequate data does not exist to determine
whether such exposure causes cancer, neurodevelopmental dis-
orders, or other ailments. As such, renewed concern about the
public health impacts of chemical exposure is prompting the
need to modernize TSCA.
THE BUSINESS CASE FOR TSCA REFORM: THE
NEED FOR GLOBAL HARMONIZATION
TSCA MODERNIZATION NEEDED TO PREVENT
PLACING U.S.-BASED GLOBAL COMPANIES AT A
COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE
A comprehensive new chemicals law in Europe known as
REACH (for the Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of
Chemicals) is expected to be enacted later this year. REACH
will have a significant impact on U.S. businesses as the chemi-
cal trade across the Atlantic is estimated at $600 billion every
year, and U.S. companies reportedly have $2.5 trillion invested
in Europe.38 As a result, many predict that REACH will alter the
chemical industry worldwide. 
In short, REACH will compel U.S. companies that do busi-
ness in the European Union to develop and make public basic
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health and safety data on the chemicals used in production. The
increased scrutiny imposed on chemicals by REACH may put
global chemical companies at a competitive disadvantage com-
pared to their domestic U.S. competitors and creates new pres-
sure for global harmonization.
REACH is intended to reverse the existing burden of proof
by requiring manufacturers or importers of chemicals in Europe
to make publicly available basic screening level toxicity and
exposure information.39 It is based on the principle of “no data,
no market.” Each chemical manufactured or imported in Europe
over a minimum threshold will need to register by, among other
things, submitting a human health and environmental safety
assessment. Chemicals will be prioritized for evaluation and
authorization based on production volume and risk (e.g. priority
is given to chemicals known to have persistent and bio-accumu-
lative toxic properties or have endocrine disrupting properties).
Chemicals of concern will require authorization to continue in
use in the EU if the risk to human health or the environment is
“adequately controlled” or if the “socio-economic benefits out-
weigh the risk to human health or the environment … and if there
are no suitable alternatives.”40 The scale of potential health ben-
efits is enormous, with an EU Commission study illustrating that
the total health benefits of REACH could be in the order of mag-
nitude of 50 billion euros over the next 30 years.41
In the United States, REACH may have the perverse impact
of penalizing companies that develop health data to demonstrate
the safety of their products. Because REACH will apply to U.S.
companies that manufacture or export into the European Union,
those companies will need to develop – or join consortia to
develop – the health and safety data needed for EU authorization.
In comparison, a U.S. company that domestically manufactures
an alternative chemical will not be required by TSCA to conduct
similar tests and thus will avoid a potentially significant expense.
The result will be an unfair playing field. One can readily
foresee the day when a company that has conducted the studies
necessary to receive EU authorization seeks to level the playing
field by compelling a competitor’s products to undergo similar
reviews.42 Put differently, once a number of leading U.S. compa-
nies have brought their operations into compliance with REACH,
it is hard to see why they would want their U.S. competitors to
continue operating without conducting a similar safety review. 
At the very least, REACH will transform the U.S. political
dynamic on chemical policy. Once U.S. chemical companies
exporting to Europe have made basic health and safety screen-
ing data on their products publicly available, the industry’s tra-
ditional reluctance towards similar transparency in the United
States will likely change. Inevitably, therefore, REACH will
bolster TSCA modernization efforts.
NEW AND EMERGING STATE LAWS ARE CREATING A
PATCHWORK OF CONFLICTING CHEMICAL
REGULATIONS
Recent scientific developments, along with the lack of fed-
eral leadership on chemical issues, have led to increased activi-
ty by the states. In recent years, the number of individual states
enacting laws banning or restricting the use of certain chemicals
has escalated sharply. The emerging patchwork of potentially
inconsistent state laws creates a very difficult and unpredictable
business climate. Modernization of TSCA would help prevent
the confusion and needless duplication associated with 50 dif-
ferent state chemical policies. 
State regulation of brominated flame-retardants illustrates
this point. These chemicals, which have been detected in every-
thing from human breast milk to house dust, are linked in ani-
mal studies to thyroid, liver, and neurological developmental
disorders. Seven states have enacted bans on the manufacturing,
processing, or distribution of products containing certain bromi-
nated flame-retardants and legislation is pending in at least three
other states.43 Most of these laws limit the use of two specific
flame-retardants (pentaBDE and octaBDE), but a pending bill in
Washington State would also cover yet a third compound
(decaBDE).44 Similarly, most of these laws apply to concentra-
tions over 0.1 percent, but Maine’s prohibition applies only to
concentrations over one percent. 
A similar patchwork of state laws is emerging with respect to
mercury. Some states have banned mercury thermometers and
novelty items containing mercury (Rhode Island, New Hampshire,
Connecticut, Oregon, Michigan, Maine), others regulate auto
switches (Oregon, Maine), and some focus on the use of products
containing mercury in schools (Maine) or hospitals (Michigan).
California has banned mercury from landfills and restricted the
mercury content of vaccines to pregnant women and babies.
Trying to navigate the maze of differing state laws con-
sumes significant corporate resources. Unfortunately, business
will continue to shoulder the financial and human resource bur-
den until the federal government reasserts leadership on chemi-
cal policy. Until TSCA is modernized, a growing number of
chemicals are likely to be subject to conflicting State regulation. 
BUSINESSES ARE INCREASINGLY REALIZING THAT
THERE ARE PROFITS IN LESS TOXIC PRODUCTS
Even prior to final enactment of REACH or the adoption of
additional state-specific chemical restrictions, a growing num-
ber of businesses are discovering that the production and use of
less toxic products is profitable. Testing a chemical to obtain
more complete health and safety information prior to distribu-
tion in commerce helps validate a company’s product, enhances
a company’s reputation, and minimizes potential tort liability. In
addition, products that can be advertised as environmentally
safer alternatives increasingly have a marketing advantage over
competitor’s products. 
One reason for the growing profitability of less toxic chem-
icals is the increasing demand by downstream business cus-
tomers. For example, the major computer manufacturers,
including Intel and Dell, are demanding that their suppliers
avoid polybrominated flame-retardants.45 Similarly, the multi-
billion dollar health care group Consorta established an envi-
ronmentally preferable purchasing program and discovered that
non-polyvinyl chloride (“PVC”) based hospital feeding tubes
actually cost less than PVC based ones.46
Some companies are going even further. SC Johnson and
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Son, Inc., the manufacturers of products such as Windex, Glade,
and Pledge, established a “Greenlist process,” whereby the com-
pany evaluates each and every ingredient according to their
human health and environmental impacts.47 In the process, SC
Johnson has removed over ten million pounds of volatile organ-
ic compounds, reduced its overall environmental footprint, and
made the company among the most recognized and awarded
environmental leaders in the United States.48
The costs of ignoring a product’s potential impacts on
human health are staggering. A 2002 RAND study estimated
that the asbestos industry’s liability cost alone could reach
$210 billion, with more than 600,000 individual claims for
compensation.49 Lest one think that WR Grace’s asbestos lia-
bility is a unique case, consider the experience of RJ
Reynolds with tobacco or Merck after VIOXX.
Fortunately, the chemical industry seems to be learning this
lesson. In May 2000 for example, 3M phased out its use of
PFOS from Scotchgard and other products50 as a result of wide-
spread human exposure and concerns that the chemical was per-
sistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic. Wall Street rewarded 3M for
its responsible corporate leadership and the company’s stock
price rose.51 Based on similar concerns, DuPont and eight other
manufacturers of PFOA recently volunteered to eliminate all
sources of exposure by 2015.52
In short, the traditional profit motive and liability concerns
are accelerating the shift to less toxic substances. More and
more businesses are adopting environmentally preferable pur-
chasing programs and chemical manufacturers are already
working to satisfy this growing demand. As a result, this trend
is likely to reduce the chemical industry’s reluctance to mod-
ernize TSCA and builds support for chemical reform from the
industry’s influential downstream business customers. 
THE NEED TO PROMOTE PUBLIC AND INVESTOR
CONFIDENCE IN NANOTECHNOLOGY CREATES A
NEW DRIVER FOR MODERNIZING TSCA
In 2001, Science magazine described nanotechnology as the
“breakthrough of the year.”53 Nanotechnology – the term used to
describe the intentional engineering of materials at the atomic or
molecular level with novel properties – has the potential to revo-
lutionize fields as diverse as healthcare, energy, and manufactur-
ing. Nanotechnology has already been incorporated into experi-
mental treatments for cancerous tumors, self-cleaning windows,
wrinkle-free fabrics, and pollution-reducing fuel additives. Over
200 nanotechnology based consumer products are already on the
market,54 and over 600 raw materials, intermediate components,
and industrial equipment reportedly employ nanotechnology.55
The National Science Foundation predicts that nano-related
goods and services could be a $1 trillion market by 2015.56
One of the greatest challenges for this nascent industry is
public acceptance. The fear of nanotechnology run amok, as
exemplified in Michael Crichton’s best selling thriller, Prey, has
the potential to permanently shape the public’s perception of
nanotechnology and stifle it in its infancy. Europe’s experience
with genetically modified foods provides a cautionary tale about
the need for public acceptance of new scientific approaches. As
J. Clarence Davies, a senior advisor to the Project on Emerging
Nanotechnologies, warns, “past experience, as well as surveys
and focus groups, show that if the public does not think that the
government is exercising adequate regulatory oversight of a
potentially hazardous new technology, then it will mistrust and
likely reject that technology.”57
Many nanotech applications are subject to TSCA, which
broadly covers “any organic or inorganic substance of a particular
molecular identity.”58 Unfortunately, the gaps in TSCA become
gorges when considered in the context of nanotechnology. 
Some nanomaterials likely meet this definition and thereby
will evade government review (unless EPA chooses to issue sig-
nificant new use rules). The criteria for being considered an
existing chemical is having “the same molecular identity” as a
chemical already on EPA’s Inventory. Some nanomaterials like-
ly meet this definition and thereby will evade government
review. Nevertheless, nano-sized versions of existing chemicals
may pose unique human health risks due to their minute size and
increased surface area.
For those nanotech applications that clearly are subject to
TSCA’s new chemical program, the statute still is not an effec-
tive means to foster the safe development of nanotechnology.
Rather, TSCA discourages innovation of new nanomaterial by
failing to recognize the distinction between pre-manufacture
notification and pre-market notification. While some review
may be appropriate prior to manufacture for worker protection,
an in-depth EPA evaluation may be unnecessary for nanotech-
nologies that are years away from commercialization.
Furthermore, EPA lacks authority under TSCA to require
that a company provide health or safety data unless it has
enough information to show that a substance “may present an
unreasonable risk.” As a practical matter, EPA traditionally turns
to its structure activity relationship models as a screen for poten-
tial risk. Such models do not yet exist for nanotechnology, so
EPA is left without meaningful tools to evaluate nanomaterials.
Perhaps equally important, EPA’s review is entirely dependent
on the manufacturer’s intended use of the material and exposure
estimates, which are likely to change as new applications are
rapidly discovered without any notice to EPA (unless the
Agency by rule expressly requires such notice). 
Industry groups are beginning to recognize the need for a
more effective legal framework for nanotechnology. For exam-
ple, Chad Holliday, the CEO of DuPont, wrote in a Wall Street
Journal op-ed with Fred Krupp of Environmental Defense that: 
[B]oth public and business interests will inevitably
compel regulatory protection to ensure product safety
and to create a level playing field for business. Current
regulations, designed for a world before nanotechnolo-
gy, should be reassessed and changed as needed to
account for the novel properties of nanomaterials.
Business and government may need new approaches to
make sure workers, consumers, the public and the
environment are adequately protected.59
In short, the exploding field of nanotechnology is creating
yet another new challenge to the 30-year old U.S. toxic sub-
9 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
stances law. Businesses (and their investors) are seeking to reas-
sure an uncertain public that nanotechnologies are safe and are
increasingly adding their voices to the growing chorus support-
ing modernization of TSCA’s antiquated framework.
CONCLUSION
Scientific advances in biomonitoring have revealed that
industrial chemicals are in all Americans, even in newborn
babies. While medical researchers continue to debate whether
such chemicals are the cause of the growing occurrence of can-
cer, neurodevelopmental disorders, or other diseases, it is undis-
puted that insufficient information is available about the poten-
tial human health impacts of many of these chemicals.
Unfortunately, EPA lacks adequate authority under TSCA to
require that manufacturers provide the data needed to review
existing chemicals or sufficient information to evaluate new
chemicals prior to manufacture. 
Businesses are quietly beginning to recognize the need to
modernize TSCA with an approach that better responds to the
needs of the global marketplace. The European Union and indi-
vidual States are adopting different approaches to chemical reg-
ulations. This emerging patchwork of duplicative and sometimes
inconsistent approaches, together with the growing business
demand for less toxic products and the emerging need to safe-
guard and establish the credibility of nanotechnology, is creating
new pressures for TSCA reform from the business community. 
As a result, the discussion in U.S. chemicals policy is shift-
ing from whether to reform TSCA to how best update the 30-
year old statute. The first comprehensive overhaul legislation,
the Kids Safe Chemicals bill, was introduced by Senators
Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Jeffords (I-VT) on June 25, 2005, to
jump start this debate.60 The bill would reverse the burden of
proof by requiring manufacturers to provide basic health and
safety information prior to distributing a chemical in consumer
products. It would also create a risk-based prioritization for
chemical review and a bright line safety standard that accounts
for children’s increased sensitivity to toxic exposures. 
While the bill is not expected to be enacted this year, the
increased congressional interest reflects growing public health
concerns along with business pressure for global harmonization,
the increased profitability of producing less toxic products and
the desire to promote the safe use of nanotechnology. The con-
vergence of these trends makes modernization of the U.S. toxic
substances law inevitable during the next several years. 
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